

HISTORY OF THE DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS AND PROGRAMS

[REDACTED] HQ USAF [REDACTED]

VOLUME 22 [REDACTED]

1 JULY 1961 -- 31 DECEMBER 1961
[REDACTED] 15

Copy no. 1 of 3 copies. 284 pages

[REDACTED] AF/CVAH(S) [REDACTED]

80-CVAH(S)-D 152

COPY X-1 OF COPY 1

CHO/TS [REDACTED] 15281

DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED
BY DIRECTORATE OF PLANS,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
PLANS AND OPERATIONS ON
6 SEPTEMBER 1988

AIR BATTLE ANALYSIS DIVISION

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July - December 1961

Resume' of Major Actions

[REDACTED] During the reporting period of July - December 1961, this Division was either continuing action on or became involved in the following activities: completing action on the 1965 War Games; NATO/Warsaw Pact War Games; completing a study comparing the nuclear delivery forces of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; JCS policy on War Gaming of Joint Plans; continued to furnish a member to the Joint Advisory Group for the second study on nuclear hazards; completed a study on nuclear radiation and fall-out hazards; continued effort on an expanded CONUS target list; increased Division capability to provide damage assessment material; developed better methods of furnishing damage assessment information and coordinating the data flow in a post-attack era; completed a preliminary study of possible courses of military action in Southeast Asia; began development of a conventional war game model; monitored a study on European air defenses; damage and contamination model improvement; continued the development of STAGE (Simulation of Total Atomic Global Exchange); and continued to monitor the activities of Technical Operations (OMEGA).

1965 Attainable Force War Game

[REDACTED] The members of the FEB (Force Estimates Board) were to be briefed on the 1965 Attainable Force War Game and its variations during the reporting period. In lieu of this brief, a complete report was published and submitted to the FEB in November. This report

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[REDACTED] constituted terminal action concerning briefs, versions, etc., of the 4
1965 War Game.

[REDACTED] NATO/Warsaw Pact War Games

[REDACTED] These were two separate and distinct, yet related war games which centered on the Berlin crisis. Each was a war game analysis of our ability to deter or prevail over the Soviets in the Berlin area precipitated by the Soviet's signing a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic in December 1961.

[REDACTED] The first of the games revealed that a positive and definite threshold could be established in any struggle over Berlin through the use of conventional forces then available in Europe; however, the game also revealed that any intensity of conventional warfare above that required to establish the fact that we were willing to fight over Berlin, did not accrue to our advantage. We concluded that we could not win our objective through major conventional war methods.

[REDACTED] The second war game was more encouraging. It determined that we could attain our ultimate objective of forcing the Soviets to negotiate on terms acceptable to us - but below the level of total nuclear war by making selective use of nuclear weapons on military targets.

[REDACTED] The first of the games was completed and approved in July, the second in late August. During the last months of 1961 these games were presented 31 times and included all organizational levels in AFXPD, and in addition, the Air Force Chief of Staff, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D), Secretary of the Air Force,

[REDACTED] the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and selected members of FEB, WSEG, [REDACTED] 5
NATO Standing Group, USAFE, CNO, NATO, Bureau of the Budget and
Department of State.

[REDACTED] Comparison of Nuclear Delivery Forces of the United States vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union (JCS 1924/127)

[REDACTED] A study comparing the nuclear delivery forces of the
United States and the Soviet Union was prepared by the JCS. The
Air Force portion of the study required review and revision of a
previous report, "Nuclear Weapon Delivery Vehicles - Programmed
Assets Report" and the current National Intelligence Estimate.

Review of the two documents by this Division revealed errors in the
number and capabilities of various fighter aircraft. Recommendations
for up-dating were made to the JCS and this body approved the Air
Force's position.

[REDACTED] JCS Policy on War Gaming of Joint Plans (JCS 1948/51)

[REDACTED] The Division completed Air Force action on JCS
1948/51 (Policy of the JCS on the War Gaming of Joint Plans) a
document initiated by the Joint War Games Control Group. Generally,
the paper specified JCS policy on the control and security of all
aspects of war games, prohibited the release of current Joint Plans
information to civilian contract personnel and provided for individual Service determination as to the future use of in-house war
games.

[REDACTED] Second Nuclear Hazard Probability Study (Risk II)

[REDACTED] In response to directives from the National Security
Council, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, this Division continued
to assist the Joint Advisory Group, JCS, in preparing a study on the

HISTORY OF THE COMBINED PLANS DIVISION

1 Jul 61 - 31 Dec 61

ORGANIZATION

The organization mission and facilities of the Division remained the same as previously reported. Officer personnel strength at the close of this period was one short of UMD authorization. Staff of 2 airmen and 11 civilians constituted full strength for these positions. Officer losses during the period were Colonels Robert A. Ackerly, Robert D. Curtis, Woodard E. Davis, Thomas N. Wilson, and Majors James R. Allen and William Y. Smith. Officer gains were Colonels Rexford H. Dettre, Joseph H. Dover, William L. Cosby, Neal J. Graham, Harold F. Layhee, Martin C. McWilliams, Robert Muldrow, Cecil H. Scott; Lt Colonels Charles I. Bennett, Jack P. Owens; and Majors Fred Abbott, Charles W. Bulow, and Matthew T. Dunn.

JOINT STRATEGIC PABILITIES PLAN (JSCP-63)

The Joint staff initiated the development of JSCP-63 by circulating a 78 page flimsy on September 1961. Our initial comments, submitted 9 October, were lengthy and substantive since there was little in the proposed plan that agreed with the Air Force view of national strategy.

[REDACTED] Most of our objections centered around the fact that the plan interpreted certain fiscal actions, which increased conventional forces for the Berlin crisis, as a fundamental shift in the agreed strategy of the U.S. and its Allies. In articulating this shift of strategy, the proposed plan attempted to develop rather than interpret or implement basic national security policies. In addition, much of the content of the plan was theoretical, philosophical and rambling; it reversed the sword and shield concept by advocating a conventional strategy; and nuclear weapons were to be used only as necessary to avoid defeat. In our view, approval of a strategy with these concepts would have inevitably resulted in hopeless demands for force and logistic increases.

[REDACTED] Our approach in addressing this plan was, first, to prove or disprove the Joint Staff's presumption of a fundamental shift in strategy; second, that the BNSP¹/ approved by the JCS and JSCP-62 should provide the basic guidelines for development of JSCP-63. Also, since we believed that the plan was much too lengthy for maximum effectiveness, we recommended deletion of the controversial material, consolidation of the extraneous portions, and a careful analysis of the remaining content.

A great percentage of our recommendations was adopted in the second flimsy which was circulated on 1 November 1961, and still more in the two buff^{2/}s that followed; these being circulated on 24 November and 6 December 1961, respectively. There was a total of five action officer meetings prior to the planner's meeting on 12 December 1961. The latter resulted in four remaining divergencies, one of which was a joint Navy-Air Force nonconcurrence, while the other three were splits by the Army. The Navy-Air Force position opposed a conventional offensive strategy in the NATO area which was advanced by the Joint Staff and Army.

The "green"^{3/} of this plan, containing the above nonconcurrences, was first placed on the JCS agenda on 29 December 1961. The Operations Deputies addressed the document on 9 January 1962, and finally resolved all issues in favor of the positions advanced by the Air Force on 10 January 1962, at which time the plan was "red-striped."^{3/}

The end result is that the present plan is radically different from, and, in our view, is a vast improvement over the flimsy presented to the Services three months previously. It does not, of course, represent all the strategic guidance desired by the Air Force, but it is believed to reflect a sound strategy that could be implemented within the current military capabilities of the U.S. and its Allies.

2/ J-5 P 779/1, 24 Nov 61 & J-5 P 779/2, 6 Dec 61 [REDACTED] D/Plans
3/ JCS 1844/350, 11 Jan 62 [REDACTED] D/Plans Files

Atlantic Council that these force requirements represent an acceptable direction and basis for conduct of the 1962 Triennial Review action.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS NATO AND THE ATLANTIC NATIONS

During the period covered by this history there has been a gradual revelation of the rationale behind the new U.S. policy toward NATO to the principal nations of the Alliance. The U.S. paper entitled "Rationale of U.S. Military Policy in the Berlin Crisis from the NATO Standpoint"^{89/} has been shown to officials of Germany, United Kingdom and France. Secretary McNamara's speech to the Ministerial Meeting in Paris on 14 December 1961^{90/} was a further attempt to explain the new policy and to secure NATO acceptance of the new concept. Although temporarily deferred within NATO, there has been increasing pressure within the U.S. government for the U.S. to take action to amend the NATO Political Directive^{91/} and Strategic Concept^{92/} to incorporate the new U.S. policy.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

A major effort during this period was developing plans for possible mobilization and deployment of military forces to Europe and review or preparation of contingency plans at the Service, U.S. unified command, Tripartite,

89/ JCS 1907/449, dtd 7 Nov 61 [REDACTED] D/Plans File

90/ JCS 2305/698, dtd 26 Dec 61 [REDACTED] D/Plans File

91/ CM(56)138 (Final), [REDACTED] dtd 13 Dec 56, D/Plans File

92/ MC 14/2, 21 Feb 57, [REDACTED] Sub-Registry

[REDACTED]
Quadripartite and NATO levels to cope with the Communist threat to Berlin. This effort culminated in a JCS recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for partial mobilization.^{93/}

[REDACTED] The USAF increase in forces as requested of Congress^{94/} was accomplished by recalling to active duty 25 ANG Tactical Fighter/Reconnaissance, 6 ANG Transport, 5 Reserve Troop Carrier Squadrons, and 1 Tactical Control Group; and retaining in the active inventory 6 B-47 wings, 6 KC-97 squadrons, 5 B/RB-66 squadrons; and 4 C-118 squadrons.

Similarly Army and Navy active duty forces were increased by recall of National Guard, Army Reserve, Fleet Reserve, Fleet Reserve units and personnel as well as retention of vessels and personnel scheduled for release during this period. Compared to this expansion of U.S. military capability, other NATO country air forces improvements were modest - ranging from insignificant through small increases in aircrew and aircraft combat ready rates to activation of combat squadrons.^{95/}

[REDACTED] As directed by the JCS,^{96/} the Services and the unified commanders prepared various plans for deployment and employment in Europe by 1 January 1962 of a force composed of up to 28 Tactical Fighter/Reconnaissance squadrons and 6 Army divisions.

93/ JCS 1907/321, dtd 11 July 61 [REDACTED] D/Plans File

94/ Sec Def Testimony before Congress - 31 Jan 61, File in SAFLL

95/ SHAPE 188/61, dtd 15 Sep 61, Sub-Registry [REDACTED]

96/ JCS 1907/399, dtd 13 Sep 61, D/Plans File

[REDACTED] Deployment of eleven ANG squadrons and a supporting Tactical Control Group to Europe permitted redeployment to the CONUS of 7 tactical squadrons based in Europe since August 1961.^{97/} The 7th Army was augmented by individual filler personnel, round-out units, one Armored Cavalry Regiment, three Battle Groups in an exercise status, plus equipment and supplies prepositioned for one Armored and one Infantry division.

[REDACTED] In consonance with JCS guidance,^{98/} the unified/specified commands have developed a family of separate but related plans appropriate for implementation singly or in combination to meet the threat of Communist Closure of Allied access to Berlin. This family of plans, covering 67 courses of action, has world-wide application. Recognizing that execution of the broad spectrum of military actions, for which plans have been prepared, must be accomplished within the context of national policy and in consideration of the political-military factors involved, the JCS forwarded to Sec Def^{99/} a preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict. The recommended sequence of actions, ultimately incorporated into a Presidential policy directive to USCINCEUR,^{100/} established four phases of activity ranging from a passive probe of Communist intentions to deny Allied access

97/ JCS 2147/214, dtd 10 Oct 61, D/Plans File

98/ JCS 1907/411, dtd 22 Sep 61, D/Plans File

99/ JCS 1907/433, dtd 12 Oct 61, D/Plans File

100/ JCS 1907/435, dtd 19 Oct 61, D/Plans File

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to Berlin, through buildup of forces, employment of large scale non-nuclear forces, selective use of tactical nuclear weapons, to general nuclear war.

[REDACTED] USAF interest in planning activities of the "Live Oak" staff are represented on a continuing basis through Service Point-of-Contact membership on the Berlin Contact Group. During September 1961, a Berlin Contact Group, composed of a representative of each Service and each Joint Staff Directorate, was established under the chairmanship of Major General Gray, U.S. Army, JSSC. DOD is represented on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group by General Gray and Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group in turn represents the United States on the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group which provides direction to USCINCEUR in his "Live Oak" position.

[REDACTED] On 17 October 1961, the North Atlantic Council directed 101 major NATO military commanders to initiate contingency planning in order to place the Alliance in a position to cope with Soviet Bloc actions in a Berlin crisis. Plans responsive to this directive are in process of development and, when completed, may be expected to be published under the title "BERCON PLANS" and forwarded to national authorities for approval.

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[REDACTED]
101 / JCS 1907/423, dtd 3 Oct 61, D/Plans File

COMMAND PLANS BRANCH

Four Questions on Berlin

In July 1961, the Chief of Staff formulated four questions on the Berlin crisis which involved different levels of military actions that might be taken to keep the Berlin corridors open. An Air Staff team was established under the chairmanship of Colonel Wilson, Chief, Combined Plans Division, to prepare answers to the four questions. Three of the questions involved different levels of probing actions in the corridors. A fourth question asked what would be required to engage in a full-scale nonnuclear war with the Soviets in Europe. Answer to this latter question was prepared by the Command Plans Branch. Answer was based on the "Air Force Conventional Requirements Study (Project #209)" which was completed during the latter portion of calendar year 1960. This study had considered the question of what Air Force forces would be required to engage in all-out nonnuclear war with the Soviets or the Red Chinese. The Project #209 study concluded that a net increase of 144 wings and 21 separate squadrons and an increase of 432,700 Air Force personnel, plus associated expansions in the overall Air Force posture would be required. In an extrapolation of these conclusions, it was determined that the majority of the requirements would be generated in engaging the Soviets in an all-out nonnuclear war in Europe and, therefore, similar requirements were submitted in answer to the question posed.³

³. On file in AFXPD-PL-CP, "Four Questions."

[REDACTED]
which envisions operations of theater scope -- i.e., relatively large land areas, is in sharp contrast to the Navy concept of maintaining a local air umbrella over the fleet and/or at the scene of local surface combat operations for limited periods of time. These differing concepts are clearly reflected in Service programs, the Air Force placing major emphasis on tactical offensive forces, while the Navy emphasizes air defensive forces.

[REDACTED] General LeMay, Chief of Staff, USAF, signed and forwarded this letter to the Secretary of the Air Force on 8 July 1961. The Secretary of the Air Force, did not desire to forward it to the Secretary of Defense. However, this letter has been used subsequently in part and in whole in various reports to the Secretary of Defense in an effort to clarify this conceptual issue.

[REDACTED] Operation STAIR STEP (Berlin Build-up)

[REDACTED] On 25 August 1961, a requirement was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹⁷ for a weekly informational input on the status of specific Air Force actions taken to provide USCINCEUR force augmentation and other significant actions taken to meet the Berlin crisis. The purpose of this requirement was to provide information for a weekly Joint Staff briefing on this subject as requested by the Secretary of Defense. The nickname STAIR STEP was assigned to these actions. Lt Col John W. Bohn, Jr. was designated project officer. Scheduled briefings were conducted regularly throughout this reporting period. The specific Air Force actions were as follows:

1. Retain 5 B/RB-66 squadrons.
2. Retain 3 F-100 squadrons.

17. DJSR 1022-61, 25 Aug 1961, on file AFXPD-PL-FPC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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3. Call up 25 Air National Guard squadrons and one tactical control group.
4. Retain 4 C-118 squadrons.
5. Call up 6 Air National Guard C-97 squadrons.
6. Call up 5 C-124 squadrons.
7. Plan for activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
8. Start negotiation for European bases.
9. Emphasize nuclear power option.
 - a. Initiate exploratory negotiations with French for nuclear storage rights.
 - b. Accelerate B-52 and B-47 ground alert.
10. Increase Air Force procurement.

Additional approved actions included:

1. Deployment of Air National Guard squadrons to Europe and the return of seven regular Air Force tactical fighter squadrons which made up the initial CINCEUR augmentation force.
2. Exercise LONG THRUST.
3. Project BAMBOO TREE.
4. Project SILK PURSE.

All Air Force actions have been completed with the exception of LONG THRUST and BAMBOO TREE which are in scheduled progress.

[REDACTED] Near Term Objectives ("Do List") Status Reporting

[REDACTED] On 12 October 1961, the first quarterly submission¹⁸ of progress on "Retention 11 Tactical Squadrons" (Do List Number 6-2), Near Term Objectives Status Reporting, was forwarded to AFXPD-PY. Action to retain 11 squadrons has been completed. These 11 squadrons initially considered in respect to the Army close air support requirement, are included in the overall tactical air force inventory and are not identified for a specific role at this time.

18. Do List No. 6-2, 12 Oct 61, on file AFXPD-PL-FPC [REDACTED]

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and to provide basic guidance for the development of definitive recovery plans. A principal objective of this project is to insure that recovery planning will be included as an integral part of all USAF war planning. Accordingly, upon approval of the AFCS 2/13 the concept and recovery planning guidance will be included in the USAF War Plans.

Berlin Planning

Early in July, planning was undertaken in order to submit recommendations⁵⁰ to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning increase in the size of the Air Force in the event Soviet actions regarding Berlin appeared to foreshadow a long period of greatly heightened tensions. Recommended increase to the force, as forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁵¹ to the Secretary of Defense, was primarily in the tactical area, with augmentation mobilization coming from the Reserve Forces. Some increase was also reflected in Strategic and Air Defense Forces. Subsequent action⁵² was taken to develop planning required to mobilize and deploy forces necessary to augment Allied Forces in Europe.

Program Packages

Initial joint planning action⁵³ was taken under the new "Program Package" concept for preparation of the FY-1963 and

50. JCS 1907/319, on file in AFXPDR-A.
51. JCSM-477-61, on file in AFXPDR-A.
52. JCS 1907/399, on file in AFXPDR-A.
53. JCS 180/455, on file in AFXPDR-A.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

[REDACTED] In accordance with its assigned functions¹, the International Affairs Division has continued to review and recommend action on the policy aspects of those International Politico-Military matters in which the U.S. Air Force is concerned. This historical report summarizes the most important developments and activities during the period 1 July through 31 December 1961.

[REDACTED] Some organizational changes to the Division are worthy of note. In October, the position of Special Assistant for Inter-regional Surveillance was established to facilitate the discharge of Divisional responsibilities in pursuing what has come to be known as "cold war actions". Dr. Delavan P. Evans, GS-15, was selected to fill this position.

[REDACTED] In November, the Division was augmented by the assignment of the Foreign Agreements Branch, a transfer from the old Foreign Agreements Division which was dis-established.

[REDACTED] For convenient reference, this historical report is presented in four sections: One for each of the three geographical Branches and the fourth for the Foreign Agreements Branch (covering the entire period of this report.)

I. D/Plans Office Instruction 20-1.

EUROPEAN-MIDDLE EAST-AFRICAN BRANCH

MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS

[REDACTED] In November 1961, a Chief of Staff, U.S.
Air Force Memorandum² was prepared for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff which referred to the U.S.-USSR negotiations on
Berlin. The Chief of Staff, USAF, believed the Joint
Chiefs of Staff should go on record stating their views
regarding the military objectives which the United States
should seek to include during any negotiations on Berlin.

[REDACTED] The proposed memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense³ made reference to various statements by the
President, as well as the heads of the United Kingdom,
France and the Federal Republic of Germany which emphasized
the import of Berlin. The fact that the prestige and the
honor of the U.S. is inextricably involved in the issue was
cited and bearing this in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
reaffirmed the West's military superiority to the Soviets
and thus, that the political negotiators could deal from
a position of strength.

[REDACTED] The memorandum continued with the thought of
the essentiality of a connecting link between the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and West Berlin. For negotiating
purposes, the goal was cited as a Western-controlled access

2. JCS 1907/464, 22 Nov 61.

3. Encl to JCS 1907/464.

[REDACTED]

by highway, rail, canal and air, but recognizing that the political price for this might be too high, a form of international control was stated as being possibly acceptable if U.S. troops were a part of the international garrison. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated their support of arrangements which would eliminate access interference except by overt use of force. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: (a) Indorsed the continuance of tripartite military garrisons in West Berlin and their right of access to East Berlin; (b) stated continued air access was mandatory; (c) stated the viability of West Berlin was an objective that makes civilian surface access essential; and (d) believe it highly important that present arrangement for travel of military observers in East Germany be perpetuated for intelligence purposes.

[REDACTED] On 12 December 1961⁴, the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, advised the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of his concurrence in principle with the Joint Chiefs. He further stated that he understood that in general terms, the U.S. position in the Washington Ambassadorial Group on this subject had been consistent with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that they had been informed of the results of these discussions by the Department of Defense representative.

4. Memo for Chmn, JCS, Subj: Mil Objective in Berlin Negotiations, 12 Dec 61.

[REDACTED]

After a successful briefing tour, the group returned to Washington on 13 December 1961.

CORRESPONDENCE FROM MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES RECALLED TO DUTY IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

The latter part of 1961 saw the recall to active duty of a number of Air National Guard people to meet the Berlin crisis. This call-up was unusual in that it occurred under other than wartime conditions. The reaction of the National Guard/recallees and their families was immediate. Their reaction was due partly to difficult conditions under which they had to serve at overseas bases not always fully prepared to receive them. Letters to Senators and Representatives, complaining about the whole situation, were forwarded in turn to the Air Force for information on which to base a reply. Many of these letters were assigned to Aerospace Policy Division. The constituents were distressed over two things generally. First, they were called up in a peacetime situation, when it had always been their understanding that they were to be called only in time of extreme emergency; and second, they felt that they were being imposed upon and their lives unduly disrupted. These two points focused a certain lack of preparation for conditioning of the minds of the populace as to exactly what the nation was doing, how it was being done, and the exact nature and seriousness of the situation confronting the nation. For example, it was never apparent in any of the correspondence received from these people that their very presence overseas in a ready-to-fight posture

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during peacetime constituted a deterrent to the potential enemy.

Further, the wives did not seem to understand the deterrent concept nor did they appear to understand that in order to preserve our American institutions, they might have to make some sacrifice in keeping with the thought expressed in the President's Inauguration address -- "ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country".

[REDACTED] All answers that were prepared in Aerospace Policy Division to these many letters spoke to these two points. First, the deterrent effect of strength abroad, ready to fight should the occasion arise, and second, closing ranks and supporting our nation in time of crisis.

[REDACTED] To illustrate, in the latter part of December 1961, an Aerospace Policy Division letter,¹⁵⁷ in reply to a distressed New Jersey housewife, sought to allay her concern over her husband's absence and to instill in her an appreciation of the circumstances necessitating her husband's recall to duty. The interesting aspect of this exchange of letters was the wife's response. She expressed her appreciation for the interest and concern of the Air Force and indicated that she was less resentful and more tolerant of the Defense Department actions as a result of the Aerospace Policy Division letter. She added that she now understood the necessity for the recall to active duty and was heartened that the Air Force was aware of the domestic

157. Ltr to Mrs. C.P. Rapier, dtd 29 Dec 61, on file in Aerospace Policy Division

problem of planning for one's future and security in our society. It would appear that some effort could have been made to inform and inspire these people at the time they were called to duty so that they understood why they were being called and the extent and nature of their contribution to the national welfare in a national crisis.

INTERCEPTION AND ENGAGEMENT INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

a. [REDACTED] This branch actioned for the JCS a CINCONAD proposal¹⁵⁸ that:

(1) Current interception and engagement instructions¹⁵⁹ for U.S. air defense forces be revised to include ballistic missiles in the definition of "hostile objects", and their use as "hostile acts".

(2) Certain automatic self-defense actions be taken by CINAD/NORAD on receipt of BMEWS alarm prior to a declared DEFCON, to include scramble and dispersal of nuclear-armed U.S. air-defense aircraft.

(3) BMEWS warnings be provided the National Warning Center for civil defense use to alert civilian population prior to a declared DEFCON.

b. [REDACTED] This branch wrote the position for the Air Force as a JCS action and the following considerations were approved by the JCS:¹⁶⁰

(1) A BMEWS alarm level 3,2, or 1 is sufficiently reliable as indication of positive threat of imminent attack to warrant certain

158. JCS 2084/98, 11 Aug 61

159. JCS 2084/56, 7 Dec 56

160. Decision on JCS 2084/101, 21 Nov 61